SN 563 233 [521] [554] [422] depends on his herds: they are his only resource, his only wealth, and his only pride. When two nomads meet, whether they are Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Mongols, or Tibetans, the first subject that comes up is their cattle. Among nomads, social status is established by the possession of horses, camels, and livestock in general, and only secondarily determined by titles or descent. This is especially true for the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Tibetans, and to a lesser degree for the Mongols, among whom aristocratic birth (real or imagined) plays an important role.

SN [342] [352] [353] The average nomad's life can be described as follows: he lives in a roomy felt tent, furnished with house altar, in the case of Buddhists, or with an artistically made book-stand for the Quran in the case of Muslims, and some chests and carpets. The whole family takes care of the livestock, and periodically the migration unit moves during the summer time from pasture to pasture, preserving the richest and most protected grazing land for the winter time. The weather plays a fatal role in the welfare of the nomad's livestock, and every so often a migration unit (the ail, the aul, the ayir, the omoq, otoq, xotn, or uruq, the ulus or even the aimaq) loses its livestock. In this case, those clans which still own enough livestock divide their herds and lend part of them to those who suffered the loss. Collective cooperation is exercised in this respect by Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Mongols, while the nomadic Tibetans, in a similar situation, have quite a reputation for robbing neighboring tribes of their livestock.

SN [621] [614] [426] [476]

SN 563 771 The nomadic way of life, the close contact with nature and dependence on nature promotes animism, shamanism, and spiritualism, which goes hand in hand with the prevailing religions of Islam (in the case of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Salars, and some Tibetan clans) and Buddhism (in the case of the Mongols, Tibetans, and Sarigh-Uighurs). As a general rule, the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh are not very fanatic or ardent Muslims, and neither are the Mongols very pious Buddhists, but still, both feel strongly about their religious although they are rather lax in their observance. No matter how poor a Buddhistic nomad is, he voluntarily supports and feeds wandering lamas, invites several on major occasions (birth, death, and marriage if the bride's father can afford it), pays them, and finally is accustomed to the old tradition ot giving a small percentage of his livestock every year to Buddhistic monasteries. All nomads are very superstitious, and the relationship between cause and effect is often misinterpreted, e.g., in the case of disease or weather. It is safe to say that the dominant motives of the nomads are economic in the first place and religious in the second place.

SN [792] [794]

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Kazak RQ2

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V. Individualistic and Collectivistic Bents and Traditions

The nomadic society of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Mongols shows collectivistic trends insofar as the pastures are always owned collectively and the livestock can be taken care of and protected only cooperatively. In periods of war and uprisings, the livestock had to be protected militarily, which was one reason why the military organization of the nomads, introduced by Chingis Khan, survived up to the twentieth century. Here we can say that the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh still shows a tremendous martial spirit, especially the Kazakhs who fought the Communists in 1949 and 1950 in a heroic way in spite of the fact that they were outnumbered from the very beginning.

N S 563 181

As a matter of fact, the Mongols show much less martial spirit than neighboring Kirghiz, Kazakh and especially Tibetans, who constantly rise up here and there, becoming a major nuisance for Peking, although they are hopelessly outnumbered by Chinese Communist Troops. Many explorers agree independently that the Mongols, once intrepid, dauntless, unafraid, frightful and terrifying warriors, make now the impression of being inefficient soldiers, timid, downhearted, and discouraged (so Rockhill, Howorth, Tafel, Vladimirtsov, Hedin, Futterer, and Filchner). Russian scholars, above all B. Vladimirtsov in his Le Regime Social Des Mongols, Le feodalisme Nomade, Paris 1948, blame Buddhism for the disappearance of the martial spirit and courage of the Mongols. This opinion is, however, contradicted by the fact that Tibetans, who have been influenced by Buddhism some centuries longer than the Mongols, are well-known as tough and cunning fighters and apparently fearless and daring insurgents.

S N 563 181 971 114

N 563 992

Almost every Tibetan family has at least one son in a monastery. They faithfully pay their tributes to these monasteries where their sons live as novices or monks. The monasteries are the only cultural centers of the nomads. Kumbum might be named as a magnificent example in regard to external architectural beauty as well as internal wealth in respect to its library, printing house, and the spiritual value of its schools and its Lamaistic academies.

S N 563 668 233 [361]

There are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime is determined to abolish nomadism and to make the nomads sedentary or at least semi-sedentary. The first step was the erection of permanent winter sites. The attitude of the nomads toward the regime seems to be ambivalent. The erection of veterinary stations for the livestock and the extension of additional irrigated pastures certainly are measures approved by the nomads but on the other hand the threatening

*563 184 628 325 439 476 Moslem enterprise and Chinese skill. For example, not many years ago in Tao-chou Old City, Kansu, there was an extensive industry of casting brazen pots and kettles for the Tibetan trade. The metal used was from old Chinese square-holed coin that is no longer used. This coinage was bought up and transported by small Moslem trader-muleteers and then sold to the Chinese artisans, who did the casting. The finished product was sold again to the Moslems, who took it into the Tibetan country as an article of trade. Thus, by Moslem enterprise a market was found for the product of Chinese skill, which kept the foundry fires going a good part of the year. However, this cooperative effort would be interrupted by the frequent disputes between the Moslems and the Chinese authorities. In the rural towns and urban cities the *563 184 628 369 463 general pattern of division of occupations and vocations is that the Moslems follow the more adventurous subsidiary callings, which require more hardship and daring. Such occupations as innkeeper, trader, muleteer, carter, soldier, and the like attract proportionately more Moslems than Chinese. The Chinese, on the other hand, tend to monopolize the handicraft occupations. They make the best carpenters, silversmiths, blacksmiths, masons, and tailors. There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, Moslems prepare and make up furs, probably because the handling of sheep and lambskins was closely associated with the butchering trade which, except for pork, is Moslem. Second, the Turks in Sinkiang are good carpet weavers. "The Turkestan carpet-weavers practice a family trade, using cow or camel hair in natural and in dyed shades. The boys sit before the handloom and weave very rapidly, with no apparent pattern to follow. They are working out the conventional design which has been done by their own family for many generations, for the patterns are traditional and no one would think of varying them." The Chinese show greater aptitude, at least greater preference, for the scholarly callings; they are school teachers, accountants (even in Moslem firms) doctors, engineers, and administrative officials in the civil service.

*563 184 621 162 The cooperation or division of labor is limited exclusively to the towns and cities. In the rural communities, the Moslems and Chinese have not chosen the way of tolerant cooperation. There is practically no strictly farming village which has an equal mixture of the two groups; in every case the village is predominantly one or the other. Generally, the population is composed almost entirely of one group with only a few hangers-on of the other. In the basic occupation of the village - farming - cooperation is found (578) only among people of the same racial group. Between the Chinese and the Moslems the rivalry is of sufficient intensity to eliminate or segregate one of the parties. There are villages in which live both Chinese and Chinese Moslems although in very small number. In every case, however, the representation of the two groups is not numerically equal, but is predominantly one or the other.

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175 problem is no longer one concerned with opposition to pan-racial-
668 ism (i.e., Great Hanism), but rather how to cooperate with the...
563 Chinese in struggling for the building of a free big family and in
631 opposing petty nationalism and the saboteurs of national solidarity."
(JMJP October 2, 1951).

N 3. Up to the end of 1953, it was reported that there were a total
*175 of 2,800,000 organized peasant households in the Northwest, or
592 45 per cent of the total number of peasant households (Ch'üan-chung
162 jih-pao, January 1, 1954). The bulk of the number of organized
S peasants were in the interior provinces, while in Sinkiang only
175 33.8 per cent of the peasant households were organized. Not only
592 the percentage in Sinkiang, but also the average percentage of the
162 whole of the Northwest, compared rather unfavorably with the
77.32 per cent in Inner Mongolia.

N The figures on Table 4 are numbers of farming households in
[474] the Northwest, which were organized into farmers associations
[476] and into mutual aid teams up to December, 1953, based on statis-
tics appearing in the Communist press. (Figures in parentheses
are computed from percentages given of the total).

S 4. An important factor, too, was the special position of Soviet
175 Russia in Sinkiang. Soviet authorities had succeeded in gaining a
648 foothold in Chinese Turkestan during the administration of Sheng
Shih-ts'ai and later in the political vacuum attendant upon the
withdrawal of Nationalist influence in 1948-49. Soviet troops were
stationed at strategic points and Soviet party and consular officials
actually held the reins of power. Soviet interests were confirmed
in the treaty signed between Peking and Moscow in February, 1950,
to which were attached two codicils providing for the organization
of two joint stock companies for Soviet exploitation of the oil and
mineral resources in Sinkiang (not excluding the possibility of the
mining and shipment of uranium ores to the Soviet Union). To
implement these agreements, large numbers of Soviet experts
arrived to set up machine works, power plants, and to assist the
Chinese in the work of geological survey, veterinary and medical
research, the operation of trucking lines and state farms, cotton
production, insect eradication and sheep-raising (NCNA interview
with Burkhan, Kuang-ming Jih-pao, September 27, 1955). In the
face of Soviet domination of Sinkiang, it was difficult for Communist
China to assert its rule, except nominally, in that remote province.

It was with the death of Stalin that there was, ostensibly, a
reappraisal of Soviet relations with Communist China. During the
visit of Nikita Khruschev and Nikolai Bulganin to Peking in October,
1954, the pattern of Sino-Soviet partnership was readjusted to make
it more palatable to the ego of the Chinese leaders. In regard to
Sinkiang, one of the five agreements reached as a result of the
Peking talks was for the sale of Soviet shares in the two joint
stock companies to Communist China, transforming them into

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 513]

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Table 4. ORGANIZATION OF THE PEASANTS IN THE NORTHWEST UP TO DECEMBER, 1953
(Based on Communist statistics)

	Total Population (1953 census)	Organized Farming Households Number	Percentage of total farming households	Mutual Aid Teams	Permanent Mutual Aid Teams Number	Percentage of Total No. of Teams	Agricultural Producers Cooperatives	State Farms
Northwest China	35,358,000	2,800,000	45 %				305	
Shensi	15,881,000	1,424,800	47 %	280,848	34,381	12.2%	234	93
Kansu (including Ninghsia)	12,929,000		45 %	194,400	19,400	10 %	32	50
Ninghsia (721,000)			53 %	13,615	2,535	16 %	19	-
Chinghai	1,677,000	96,000	52.3%	25,106	1,840	7.3%	10	-
Sinkiang	4,874,000	299,000	33.8%	51,600	(2,500)	5 %	10	-

Central People's Government, the province of Ninghsia was merged into Kansu, (in June, 1956, the territory of the Alashan and Edsingol Mongols in Ninghsia was incorporated into the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), the municipality of Sian was transferred from the direct control of Peking to the Shensi Provincial People's Government, and the Northwest Administrative Council was dissolved.

However, by other more subtle means, the control of Peking over the Northwest provinces and the ascendancy of the Chinese over the national minority peoples in the border regions were bolstered, not reduced. The election of 1953-54 signalized the kick-off of the much heralded transition of China to socialism. This was the General Line of the State during the period of transition which was adopted by the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 24, 1953. In its economic aspects, it called for industrialization and collectivization, and in its political aspects, it stressed the consolidation of the unity of the peoples of China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, and Mao Tse-tung. (JMJP March 28, 1954).

These two aspects were interrelated, industrialization and collectivization aimed at bringing further the people in line with the policies of the Communist party and government and consolidation was to be accomplished by the employment of cadres and the party members to arouse and organize the masses (cf. decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in NCNA, January 8, 1954).

A. Collectivization

Under a deliberate policy of the state, intensified by the Korean War, augmented by equipment and personnel transferred from the coastal cities and facilitated by improvement in transportation, industrialization had made tremendous headway in the Northwest. And with industrialization, the control of the workers by the state also increased. By the end of 1955, 540 kilometers of the 2,800 kilometer Lanchou-Sinkiang Railway had been completed, further extending Communist control over the Northwest.

However, the population of the Northwest is still predominantly agricultural, and it was in the organization of the residents of the rural areas into mutual aid teams and cooperatives that the extent of Communist control over the masses is best revealed. The situation in the four Northwest provinces is as follows:

Shensi: During the year 1954, the program of organizing the farmers into mutual aid teams and agricultural producers cooperatives suffered a setback due to incompetent leadership. (Report of Chao Shou-shan, NCNA August 14, 1954). As a report of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party revealed (JMJP August 19, 1954): "After the summer harvest, due to slack

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*175 leadership to mutual aid and cooperative organs in some places,
*668 a number of mutual aid teams ceased to exist. In Han-ch'eng
474 and Ho-yang, in Shensi, 20-30 per cent of such teams were sus-
[476] pended." As to agricultural cooperatives, the number increased from 1,970 or 1.32 per cent of the farming households in November 1954, to 17,000 or 16,83 per cent of the population by summer of last year. Plans are to increase the number fo 35,000 by 1957 to embrace 55 per cent of the households. However, by summer of last year (1955) too, the number of handicraft and supply and marketing cooperatives in Shensi embraced 13.64 per cent of the agricultural workers, and the 5416 credit cooperatives had a membership of 1,400,000 households, which was 45 per cent of the total farming households.

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[476] Kansu: in this province, where it was claimed that 57 per cent of the peasant population was organized, the number of mutual aid teams dropped from 245,300 in the spring of 1954 to 212,000 in 1955 and only a third of these was permanent. Due to "rightist ideology" of the cadres, the number of agricultural producers cooperatives also dropped from 7,419 in the fall of 1954 to 7,151 in spring of 1955. However, this was quickly rectified and by the end of the year, there were 16,849, embracing 23.43 per cent of the rural households and plans are to have 47,400 by 1957 to comprise 60 per cent of the households.

Chinghai: The 575 agricultural producers cooperatives at the beginning of 1955 embraced 80,000 households or 50 per cent of the peasant population. Sixty-seven per cent of the rural population was organized. (67.93 per cent)

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175 Sinkiang: Only five per cent of the 58,773 mutual aid teams in the
178 summer of 1954 were permanent. The number was increased to
474 75,275 embracing 63.32 per cent of the farming population, with
476 28.33 per cent of the teams permanent. The number of agricultural producers cooperatives rose to 1,702 by fall of 1955, but they occupied only five per cent of the cultivated area and their 47,328 households came to only 5.3 per cent of the farming population. The plans for 1957 are for 11,216 cooperatives to include 41 per cent of the households.

Only in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous District was the collectivization more satisfactory. In the summer of 1955, there were 6,200 mutual aid teams and 243 cooperatives embracing 65 per cent of the farmers. The political organization of the rural population in Sinkiang was also behind the other provinces. According to Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 45,62 per cent of the farmers were organized in spring of 1955. (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

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Table 6. CADRES ASIGNED TO AND TRAINED FOR COOPERATIVE WORK

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	Total No. of Cadres	Number of Native Cadres	Cadres Assigned to Cooperatives	Cadres to be trained for cooperative work
Shensi			20,000	200,000
Chinghai	8,500	3,400	3,100	7,300
Sinkiang	51,000	34,400	27,000	
Kansu (no figures available)				

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*175 B. Transfer of Cadres
*668 The vast expansion of cooperatives and the intensification of
474 the collectivization of the people demanded an increase in the num-
• 476 ber of cadres to supervise them. The number of cadres assigned to the task of cooperative building and the number of cadres to be trained for such work up to the fall of 1955 are shown in Table 6.

The assignment of the large number of cadres to the rural areas was, according to Chang Chih-chung, "to consolidate the mutual aid teams and producers cooperative work under a policy of active leadership." (Ch'un-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954). However, the demoralization, the lack of discipline, the incompetence and low degree of political consciousness of the cadres when employed as officials of the people's governments during the first four years of Communist rule have not only impeded government and party work but also incurred ill-feeling among the people. The assignment of the cadres to the cooperatives in rural areas was to remove them from sensitive positions in the government.

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*175 Consequently, by 1955, when the work of the cadres in direc-
*668 ting the elections was over, there were few cadres left in the
*563 upper levels of government. This was particularly the case of
631 the national minority cadres. In Chinghai, out of the 3,400 native
5 cadres, only 93 held responsible positions in the party organiza-
175 tion in December, 1954, and in Sinkiang, only a third of the
668 cadres in party committees on all levels were natives, two-thirds
563 were Chinese. In the government and in state enterprises, the
631 number of national cadres was even less. According to Wang En-mao, secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, only 682 out of the 34,400 national minority cadres held responsible positions in the governments above the levels of county, although it was claimed in other Communist publications that 84.6 per cent of the cadres in government offices below county levels were natives. In the state commercial, animal products, tea, silk, and export enterprises, 63 per cent of the officials were Chinese. One of the reasons for the demotion of the national minority cadres was their lack of education and training. Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, seeking to rationalize this state of affairs, said that of the 36,000 national minority cadres (his figure) trained in all fields of work since 1949, only 2,500 showed enough initiative to be promoted to be leadership cadres. (JMJP September 24, 1955).

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*175 To bolster the position of the Chinese cadres and to fill the
*668 ranks depleted by the transfer of local cadres to the work of col-
166 lectivizing the peasant population, large numbers of cadres and workers were sent to the Northwest from the coastal provinces. The figures of Table 7, gathered from scattered items in the Communist press, are incomplete, but they give an idea of the horde of cadres and approved workers and students pouring into the northwestern provinces during 1955. [TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 523]

*175 party members were from the urban areas. In 1954, 4,000 work-
178 ers were admitted into the party, a 14-time increase over 1953,
*668 and in the city of Sian, 40 per cent of the new members were workers. However, the bulk of the party men were in the government where they made up 23.6 per cent of the administrative personnel. In 125 factories, mines, and government enterprises there were no party branches, and in 63 industrial units there were no party members.

In the rural areas of Shensi, up to March, 1955, less than 0.6
*175 per cent of the party members were farmers. Of the 845 hsiang
178 in Shensi, 156 had no party members and in 15 per cent of the
*668 agricultural producers' cooperatives, notably those in Yenan (the
474 old Communist capital), Han-ch'eng, and An-kang, had no party members. In the remaining 85 per cent of the cooperatives, the only party members were the members of the cooperatives and heads of the mutual aid teams. In Yenan Administrative District,
• [476] for example, out of the 106 new members inducted into the Communist Party in 1954, 82 were members of the agricultural producers cooperatives and 24 were heads of mutual aid teams, and in Ch'ang-an county, 93 per cent of the 358 new party members were from the cooperatives.

*175 The focus of attention during 1955 was the recruitment of
*668 party members from the factories and from the farms. Out of the
178 38,300 new party members to be recruited in 1955, 28,000 were to be from the rural areas, 5,600 from the factories, 3,300 from government agencies, and 1,400 from the schools. In the first batch of 6,000 new members recruited in spring of 1955 included 4,000 model farmers and 1,200 model factory workers. The total party members up to March, 1955 was 95,000.

Kansu: Party organization was stronger here than in Shensi. In 1954, 3,400 "advanced" peasants joined the party and there was a total of 3,938 rural party branches in 70.54 per cent of the hsiang. 16,200 party members held positions in the cooperatives and mutual aid teams. In 1955, 20,000 new members were recruited, and plans call for the recruitment of 120,000 Chinese Communist Party members and 480,000 New Democratic Youth League members by 1958.

Chinghai: By the end of 1954, there were 3,121 party mem-
* [563] bers in Chinghai, 732 of whom were recruited from the 3,471 national minority cadres. Out of the 190 cadres trained in the Shun-hua Salar Autonomous Area, 61 joined the Communist Party. Since it was reported that there were party branches in 70 per cent of the hsiang, party leadership is spread very thin. Of the three thousand party members in Chinghai, only 93 native party members were employed in party headquarters, and 865 assigned to rural areas. As to the New Democratic Youth League, there were at the end of 1955, 9,328 members.

241 433 Such costs could be avoided if intensive farming measures were emphasized, internal markets developed, and these in turn linked to China through a network of transport.

II. The Communist Period

241 *668 ### A. General Outline of Communist Policy for Agriculture in the Northwest

The pattern of Chinese Communist agricultural policy for this region is similar to what has emerged in China. The only differences have been in the timing and pace of reform policies which stem from the varying political, economic, and geographic conditions of the Northwest.

[423] When the People's Liberation Army had occupied the Northwest, land reform on a regional scale commenced. By 1951 land reform was completed in areas with an agricultural population of seven million; rents were reduced in areas with an agricultural population of ten million. (Current Background, No. 141, November 27, 1951. General Chang Chih-chung on Developmen. in the Northwest. p. 14.) Immediately upon completion of the land reform, concerted efforts were launched to increase the agricultural and livestock production of the Northwest through cooperativization; by establishing mutual aid teams and then combining these into agr cultural producer cooperatives where land, farm implements, and livestock are pooled. The ultimate objective of the Chinese Communists is to cooperativize all agriculture in the Northwest, and through a network of such cooperatives, concentrate on raising productivity by expanding cultivation, sowing with better types of seeds, and using more advanced tools and farming methods. Cooperativization is taking place in villages and oases, and steps have been taken to establish state farms in regions where there are large tracts of reclaimed land.

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241 311 185 *668 Survey teams were sent out to determine what land might be reclaimed and cultivated. Upon the estimates of these teams, units of the army went out to reclaim the land. Because most of the land surveyed was desert, the construction and extension of irrigation works, the building of reservoirs, the setting up of irrigation pumps to pump the water through newly-dug canals over the desert had to begin at almost the same time.

311 185 *668 288 439 [248] Some progress has been made in extending cultivation and planting cotton by reclaiming waste land. Communist planning is ambitious and in future five year plans, they intend to make the province of Shensi a textile processing area to which Sinkiang and other areas in the Northwest will ship their cotton. In this way, it is hoped to ultimately make the entire region self-sufficient in textile production. Textile factories are being erected in Sinkiang too for the purpose of processing cotton produced there, and it is already reported that some cotton cloth is being shipped to the U.S.S.R.

000 and it is already reported that some cotton cloth is being shipped to the U.S.S.R.

452 474 *668 In the field of credit financing, purchasing and marketing, extensive efforts have been underway to place these activities under the control of cooperatives specifically erected and designed to extend State control over the rural areas. These co-ops are designed to assist in agricultural planning and to assure the realization of annual output quotas. Credit cooperatives are closely coordinated with the development of agricultural producer cooperatives in order to provide them with funds to develop and simultaneously to absorb any liquid savings that have accrued among these co-ops. For the purpose of State purchasing and marketing, cooperatives have been set up which survey individual households to determine household consumption and output. Frequently, advance purchases of expected agricultural surpluses are made by these co-ops. All surpluses which can be purchased by State marketing and supply co-ops are channeled through State apparatus to where they can be used most efficiently.

654 232 *668 [476] [179] The State has taken measures to increase livestock production by first attempting to set up mutual aid teams among the pastoral people and sending specially trained teams into the pastoral areas to immunize animals, teach the herders better care of their stock to prevent loss of animals, and conduct breeding experiments to improve the quality of livestock. Superior types of animals from the Soviet Union have been imported on some occasions to be bred with native stock.

242 *668 [179] Pests, locusts, and animal diseases have always been a scourge in this region. The State has undertaken to acquire technicians and airplanes from the U.S.S.R. to spray regions where the threat of locusts has become serious. Insecticide has been distributed throughout the lower level agricultural co-ops and campaigns have been conducted among the peasants to eliminate plant and animal diseases.

313 *668 Teams have been sent out to survey forested portions of the region and to determine what measures might be taken to expand existent forest reserves, plant saplings, establish nurseries and carry out large-scale afforestation to prevent erosion.

241 *668 [433] [242] [474] These have been the general measures taken by the Chinese Communists so far to develop agriculture in this portion of the country. Some successes have been scored; e.g., in increasing the number of livestock and higher crop yields per acre by the introduction of better procedures of livestock care and farming. However, the program of organizing the peasantry into co-ops to achieve similar results, has not been successful in every instance.

[518] Bandits and dissatisfied portions of the minorities who did not welcome the Communists have been quite active in disrupting their programs. As the years in the first five year plan pass, the plan-

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668 training takes time before these technicians, accountants, etc.,
241 can go out and organize co-ops, operate them efficiently, and train other native cadres. The 1955 plan calls for the training of 600 technical cadres for the "Centers for Promoting Agricultural Techniques," for the training of 500 in-office cadres by rotation, and for the training of 4,190 accountants and 5,337 technicians for agricultural producer cooperatives.

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668 An additional problem (which will be mentioned at this point
657 rather than repeated when each province of the Northwest is dis-
736 cussed) concerns the soldiers' dependents in the region and the
474 plight of discharged army personnel. The State has been particu-
729 larly upset by the lack of participation of these groups in coopera-
[464] tivization and special attention is now being devoted to utilize this source of manpower. Since dependents of servicement are given certain State stipends, in food, many of them feel that by joining a cooperative they will be deprived of this compensation. Because 1955 was a critical year in the Five Year Plan, the pace of erecting new co-ops and consolidating the older ones has been increased. Now many of the dependents and demobilized soldiers who were organized in these co-ops have backed out of them and many of these co-ops have, therefore, never been consolidated. Another problem in the co-ops is that the members do not want partly disabled or female workers, and, on the other hand, many dependents feel that the State should provide for them. (No. 1004, March 10, 1955, Supplements. "Actively Organizing Servicemen's Dependents for Mutual Aid and Co-op Work." U.S. Consulate General. Survey of China Mainland Press.) The proper allocation of labor in the Northwest remains a critical problem.

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2. Chinghai

*175 By December, 1954, 575 agricultural producer co-ops had
*668 been formed, and this constituted 9.12 per cent of all households.
474 The number of mutual aid co-ops was not given but it was reported
452 that 69.7 per cent of all households had been cooperativized to
• [476] some extent. There were also 159 supply and marketing coopera-tives, 148 credit cooperatives, and 12 handicraft producer co-ops. Long term low interest loans have been extended to poor peasants to encourage them to join farming co-ops. The first allocation totalled over 138 million yuan (U.S. $5,598). The interest rate is 0.4 per cent monthly and the repayment period is spread over five years. Besides these individual loans to poor peasants, there have been additional ones to enable the peasants to build small water conservancy works and buy new types of farm tools. All totalled, state loans amounted to more than 750 million yuan (U.S. $30,426) for 1955. (Far Eastern Economic Review. Dec. 1, 1955. pp. 686-87.)

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*668 In a provincial report by Chan Kuo-sheng, Secretary General
241 of the Chinghai Provincial People's Government, on work
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suitable cotton strains for sowing and the best methods of irrigation for the large-scale cultivation of cotton in the province. 17,000 hectares (42,907 acres) are now being surveyed in the Kansu corridor and the vast plains along the Yellow River in Northwest China for future establishment of mechanized state farms. Altogether, the corridor and the plain are estimated to have over 650,000 hectares (1,616,150 acres) of wasteland. In 1954, it was found tnat the greater part of 200,000 hectares (494,200 acres) of wasteland surveyed was suitable for cotton; three new mechanized state farms have been set up so far there.

Some of the information available on agricultural policy in Kansu deals with the area around Lanchow, where there is some suburban farming, and the development of cooperatives in the Wu-chung Hui Nationality Autonomous Chou of Kansu Province (from a speech by Ma Teng-ai delivered on July 22, 1955, to the National People's Congress). Discussion of these areas will not give us a complete picture of the progress or difficulties in agricultural development but they will indicate the trend of agriculture in Kansu.

In Lanchow, it was reported that the landlord class and "feudal" exploitation of the peasants in the suburban areas had been abolished. 15,112 mou (2,297 acres) of land had been confiscated and distributed among 20,400 peasants who possessed no land or very little. Production and livelihood materials were also distributed among these peasants. So far, seven vegetable and agricultural producer co-ops and 606 mutual aid teams are in existence in the suburban areas. These included roughly 32.46 per cent of the peasant households; expanding agr cultural production to meet the daily growing needs for vegetables in the city has been stressed. By fall of 1956 it is planned to have eighty-three per cent of all agricultural rural households in the suburbs, in agricultural producer co-ops. Two socialist vegetable producer co-ops will be established. Future emphasis will be on the expansion of vegetable farms, orchards, and development of poultry and pig rearing.

The city of Lanchow has grown greatly in the past five years with the influx of troops, technicians, laborers, and their families. It is questionable whether agriculture in the surrounding areas can have maintained this population growth. This would imply that some food would need to have been shipped from China.

There have been some difficulties in developing co-ops and mutual aid teams, as in other parts of the Northwest. Planned purchases and marketing of food, extremely critical in this neighborhood since the urban life of Lanchow rests upon these marketing procedures, have not been carried off successfuly and have slowed up cooperativization. There has been evidence of bureaucratization, lack of class responsibility toward the poor and middle peasants, and a lack of serious study and investigation of conditions.

*668 563 474 • 476 185 In the Wu-chung Autonomous Chou, in Kansu, Hui and Han groups live together. Today there are 277 agricultural producer co-ops, eighty nine for the Hui and 124 for the Han. More than 3,200 mutual aid teams have been developedp 1,200 are permanent. Future policy stresses increased agricultural production by cooperativization. In a speech delivered by Ma Teng-ai to the National People's Congress however, key emphasis was placed on the correct implementation of solidifying the poor and middle class peasants and following the principle of allowing the peasants of various nationalities to enter the co-ops voluntarily. Such a desire to enter must result from the mutual benefit they feel they would receive. When agricultural producer co-ops are to be formed, namely, consolidating the various permanent mutual aid teams and pooling land, farm implements, etc. special attention is to be given the customs, habits, and religious beliefs of the different nationalities. For instance, if the Hui and Han members of the same coopérative do not want to use the same well, different wells are to be drilled, and used separately. If hogs are raised in a cooperative, they may be attended by the Han members themselves and they are not considered an auxiliary occupation of the cooperative. The Chinese Communists, in dealing with the nationality problem in the Northwest, so far have tread very lightly whenever they wished to promote cooperativization. They have proceeded very slowly, using subtle methods of persuasion to urge the various nationalities to enlist their labor power in the mutual aid and produce co-ops.

*668 669 578 474 Communist administrators complain bitterly of counter-revolutionary activities in Kansu. In a speech by Su Chen-yung, Vice Director of Public Security Bureau, he states: "Counter-revolutionaries have unceasingly wages destructive activities against the Socialist transformation enterprises in both the cities and the countryside. With a view to impeding the work of the peasants joining the cooperatives, and to sabotaging agricultural production, they concentrated on certain reactionary landowners, wealthy peasants, and Taoist leaders to cheat some backward elements into establishing false cooperatives and even organizing uprisings." (Union Research Service. Vol. 3, p. 43.)

Su Chen-yung then gives as examples the disruption of progress in establishing agricultural cooperatives, the killing of Communist cadres, the burning of supply and marketing cooperatives storehouses, etc. Such admission by Communist officials of overt violence indicates that the Chinese Communists still are encountering peasant resistance, although nearly seven years have passed since their occupation of the region.

*668 241 474 185 C. Conclusion

The Chinese Communists have attempted to control closely